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The Convergence Mechanism

How Anglosphere Political Classes Synchronise Without Coordinating, Why the Convergence Propagates One-Directionally, and What the Cases Where Propagation Was Blocked Tell Us

Paper 5 of The Divergent Societies series

The Divergent Societies series examines three things happening at once across the late-modern Anglosphere. American politics has diverged from the rest of the West. Western societies have diverged from their own historical foundations. And Anglosphere political classes have converged with each other on a managed-decline trajectory while their countries diverge from their own past. The series asks how this happened, why conventional analysis missed it, and what the structural mechanism actually is.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The synchronised behaviour of Anglosphere political classes is now hard to ignore. Hate-speech laws adopted in parallel. Equity-and-inclusion bureaucracies expanded in parallel. Near-identical immigration-policy paths. Central-bank mandates expanded beyond price stability at the same time across the major economies. And the documented synchronised hostility to the current high-fertility American executive group. The pattern raises a recurring question. How does behaviour this synchronised emerge across multiple sovereign countries without any formal way of coordinating? The standard answers fail. Davos and the World Economic Forum are conferences, not command centres. The convergent behaviour predates the forums and survives their attendance lists. Conspiracy is the wrong category.

This brief sets out the structural mechanism. The convergence has four parts working together. The first is institutional capture by demographic and ideological groups whose incentive structures favour managed decline. The second is cultural and political propagation through the professional channels those groups dominate. The third is globalisation and digital integration, which have removed the friction earlier propagation faced. The fourth is one-directional bias, determined by which institutional architectures reward which policy adoptions. The mechanism is convergent evolution under shared selection pressure, accelerated by integrated propagation infrastructure, and biased one-directionally by the institutional incentives operating on the people who populate the channels.

The diagnosis is testable. Two natural experiments where propagation was blocked — pre-1992 Russia walled off by ideological hostility, contemporary China walled off by deliberate state policy — did not develop the convergent Anglosphere pattern. They produced their own different convergences instead. The Latin American case is the parallel one. Same mechanism, different ideological output, determined by which institutional system dominates which language and cultural sphere. Once the mechanism is named, the corrective becomes specifiable. The propagation channels themselves can be addressed. Movements that succeed in restructuring them produce different outcomes from movements that compete only for office under the channels' existing rules.

1. The Empirical Pattern

This brief starts from a pattern. Across multiple Anglosphere countries, over roughly thirty years, the same political and policy positions have been adopted in synchronised ways. The pattern is observable across multiple domains.

Hate-speech and disinformation laws. Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, the European Union, and Australia have all introduced — at near-simultaneous intervals across 2018 to 2025 — laws or regulations expanding state authority over speech deemed harmful, hateful, or disinforming. The specific instruments differ. The intent and the categories of restricted expression are recognisably similar across all of them. The laws were not jointly drafted. They propagated.

Equity-diversity-inclusion bureaucracy expansion. Across the same period, every Anglosphere country's public sector, university system, and large-corporate apparatus expanded its dedicated equity-and-inclusion bureaucracy. Similar reporting frameworks. Similar training and compliance regimes. Similar definitions of protected categories. Similar mandatory-reporting obligations. None of this was centrally specified. It propagated.

Immigration-policy convergence. Across the post-2000 period, the major Anglosphere democracies have converged on similar immigration regimes. High-volume net migration as the working norm. Asylum frameworks calibrated to similar processing standards. Integration policies operating within similar multicultural frames. National political cycles have produced

surface differences at the rhetorical level. At the policy level the convergence has been tight. None of this was jointly developed. It propagated.

Central-bank mission expansion. The United States Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Canada, and the Reserve Bank of Australia have all, across the post-2008 period, expanded what they say their job is. They have added climate-related financial risk. They have added financial-system equity outcomes. They have added macroprudential considerations beyond their traditional price-stability and financial-stability roles. The legal framings differ. The substantive expansion of mission has been near-simultaneous and similar in shape. The expansion was not coordinated. It propagated.

The synchronised hostility to the current American executive group is documented in detail in the prior briefs in this series¹. It is the most visible recent case of synchronised political-class behaviour across the Anglosphere. The hostility was not coordinated. It propagated, with near-identical content, through the same channels.

Five domains. Near-simultaneous adoption across multiple sovereign countries. No formal coordination. No central drafting authority. No chain of command. The pattern requires a structural explanation. Conspiracy is the wrong category. The right one is convergent evolution under shared selection pressure, propagated through identifiable channels, and biased one-directionally by institutional incentives.

2. Why "Davos" Is the Wrong Answer

The conspiratorial reading is that the convergence is centrally directed by transnational elite institutions — the World Economic Forum at Davos, the Trilateral Commission, the Rothschilds, the Bilderberg Group, or some combination. The reading has wide circulation in popular conservative commentary. It operates as the default explanation for readers who have noticed the pattern but not analysed the mechanism.

The reading is empirically wrong. And it is wrong in a specific and instructive way. The convergence pre-dates the WEF's emergence as a public focus. The same policy patterns are observable in countries whose senior officials have not attended Davos. They are observable in administrations elected explicitly against the WEF agenda. The convergence continued through periods when Davos was disrupted — notably the 2020-2021 pandemic lockdowns — without any visible break in the convergent trajectory. The forums attended by political-class members are real. They are not the mechanism. They are downstream of it. They are places where people who already share the convergent ideological orientation gather to network, signal status, and exchange professional opportunities. The convergence would proceed without them. It precedes them. It survives their interruption.

The instructive part is why the conspiratorial reading is comfortable for the political class itself. A reading that locates the convergence in deliberate elite coordination diverts critical attention from the structural mechanism that actually produces it. If the convergence is the work of a coordinating elite at Davos, the corrective is removal or exposure of that elite — rhetorically satisfying but operationally hopeless. If the convergence is the structural output of the institutional architecture in which the political class operates, the corrective is restructuring of that architecture. That is operationally tractable. It also threatens the political class’s actual interests.

The conspiratorial reading is, in a sense, the political class’s preferred explanation for its own convergent behaviour. It misdirects criticism toward an unactionable target.

The brief’s analytical claim is that the structural reading is correct and the conspiratorial reading is incorrect. The structural reading is more politically threatening to the convergent political class than the conspiratorial one is. Once the mechanism is named structurally, the corrective architecture becomes specifiable. The political class loses the cover that the conspiratorial framing provides.

3. The Structural Mechanism: Institutional Capture and Cultural Propagation

The structural mechanism has two components working together. The first is institutional capture. This is the sorting process by which the political class becomes made up predominantly of people whose incentive structures favour particular policy directions. The second is cultural propagation. These are the channels through which the captured institutions then transmit policy patterns and ideological frames across countries. Neither component alone produces convergence. The combination does.

It is worth setting these two components inside the wider frame the series uses. The series describes a four-part apparatus. There is the progressive cultural worldview — the content. There is the establishment that carries it and rewards anyone who adopts it — in technical terms, the institutional infrastructure. There are the propagation channels that move it between countries. And there is the demographic architecture underneath, the population-level patterns that shape the political class’s incentives in the first place. This brief is about the middle two: institutional capture is what has happened to the establishment, and cultural propagation is the propagation channels doing their work. The content they carry is the progressive cultural worldview. The demographic architecture is the precondition the companion briefs examine.

Institutional capture as sorting outcome

The political class is broad. It includes elected officials, senior administrative officeholders, judicial appointees, central-bank leadership, university administrators, large-foundation officers, and senior corporate public-affairs operators. It is recruited through a sorting process that selects for specific demographic, educational, and ideological profiles. The sorting is not centrally directed. It is the cumulative outcome of millions of decisions made by individual selectors operating under the institutional incentives they personally face. A university hiring committee does not need to be ideologically coordinated to produce ideologically convergent hiring outcomes. It needs only to operate under incentives that reward ideological agreement with peers. A government department's promotion panels do not need a master plan to produce a senior cohort with similar policy instincts. They need only to reward candidates whose instincts align with the department's internal culture.

The political class has a low average family size — at or below the population average, which is itself already well below replacement — with a markedly higher rate of childlessness.

The capture is not the work of conspirators. It is the cumulative output of a sorting mechanism operating across thousands of institutions and tens of thousands of selection decisions per year, all responding to similar incentive structures. The result is convergent at the population level even though no individual selector intended that result.

Cultural propagation as transmission infrastructure

Once the political class is made up predominantly of people with similar incentive structures and similar ideological orientations, the second mechanism activates. The captured institutions operate as transmission infrastructure for policy patterns and ideological frames. They propagate them across countries through normal professional channels.

The channels are not concealed. They are the ordinary professional life of the political class. International institution staff circulate between national-government postings and OECD, IMF, World Bank, UN, and EU positions. They carry with them the policy frameworks they have operated. Those frameworks then become the templates available in the next country. International consulting firms — McKinsey, Boston Consulting, Bain, the larger accounting firms — operate across countries with similar advice products. They recommend similar policy structures across similar client situations. Professional associations of regulators, central bankers, judges, and senior administrators circulate best-practice documents, host conferences, and run professional-development programmes that are explicitly designed to converge practice across countries. Academic networks circulate ideas across the same system with similar curricula, similar peer-reviewed publication standards, and similar intellectual frames.

The convergence is not coordinated. It is the product of selection that has produced an ideologically homogeneous political class, combined with dense propagation infrastructure operating through professional channels. Each

component is observable. Each operates without conspiracy. Together they produce the synchronised behaviour the pattern documents.

Each channel is mundane on its own. Each operates with the stated professional justification of cross-country learning and the spread of best practice. The cumulative effect of all of them operating together, populated by people selected for similar ideological orientations, is rapid and comprehensive propagation of policy patterns across countries whose political classes already share the orientation that makes the patterns adoptable. The propagation is fast because the receivers are pre-disposed. It is comprehensive because the channels are dense. It is ideologically uniform because the channels are populated by people who have been selected for ideological agreement.

4. Globalisation as Propagation Accelerant

The propagation infrastructure described in the prior section is not new in kind. International professional networks, cross-country consulting arrangements, and academic and intellectual exchange have existed across most of the modern period. What is new is the intensity, speed, and friction-free quality of contemporary propagation. That change is the consequence of the post-Cold-War expansion of integration and the post-2000 digitalisation of professional and political communication.

Three structural shifts compounded across the post-1992 period. First, the end of the Cold War removed the major ideological-political firewalls that had previously bounded the propagation channels. Western European, North American, Australasian, and increasingly Eastern European political classes were drawn into a single integrated professional ecosystem. Ideas, personnel, and policy templates moved with much less friction than in the bipolar period. Second, the expansion of supranational institutions — the post-Maastricht European Union, the post-WTO trade architecture, the expanded UN bureaucracy and its specialised agencies, the post-2008 G20 architecture — created institutional infrastructure that explicitly required and rewarded cross-country policy harmonisation. Third, the post-2000 digital integration of professional communication produced near-real-time propagation of policy frames, advocacy materials, and ideological content across the entire integrated political-class ecosystem. A policy framework adopted in one country in 2025 reaches political-class members in every other country within hours. Complete with the professional networks, advocacy materials, and rhetorical framing required to argue for its adoption locally.

Globalisation did not produce the convergence on its own. The convergence's structural causes are the institutional capture and the cultural propagation infrastructure described in Section 3. Both would operate at lower intensity without the post-1992 integration. What globalisation did was dramatically accelerate propagation that was previously slower, more friction-laden, and

more bounded. A policy template might have taken a decade to propagate across countries in the pre-1992 period. It now propagates in months. Where harmonisation might have required deliberate diplomatic effort, it now propagates through ordinary professional channels at the speed of the underlying digital infrastructure. The convergence is faster, tighter, and more comprehensive than it would have been without the post-1992 integration. The mechanism is the same. The rate has accelerated by an order of magnitude.

Globalisation has not produced ideological convergence as a primary effect. It has accelerated and intensified a convergence driven by institutional capture, whose underlying mechanism predates it. Addressing the convergence requires addressing both the underlying institutional capture and the propagation infrastructure that has sped its spread.

5. The Comparative Cases: Where Propagation Was Blocked, and Where It Took Different Form

The strongest test of any structural mechanism is the case where its propagation channels are blocked or operate under different conditions. If the convergence is dependent on propagation channels rather than historically inevitable, then countries where the channels were blocked should not exhibit the convergence. Countries where the channels operated within different institutional systems should exhibit different convergences. Both predictions are testable against the historical and contemporary record. Both are confirmed.

Pre-1992 Russia and contemporary China: where propagation was blocked

The Soviet bloc operated, from the end of the war until 1991, as a political and informational space largely walled off from Western institutions. Western academic networks, Western consulting firms, Western professional associations, and Western media did not propagate into Soviet-bloc institutional life on anything like the terms they operated within the Western space. The Soviet bloc had its own institutional system with its own propagation channels and its own convergent ideological direction. What it did not have was substantial Western propagation. The result is that the Western progressive cultural-political path of the post-1960s — second-wave feminism, the sexual-revolution cultural transformation, the emergence of identity-based progressive frames — did not propagate into Soviet-bloc societies on Western timelines or in Western forms. Pre-1992 Russia did not develop second-wave feminism on Western timelines. What it had instead was its own state-mandated form of female labour-force participation, operating within an entirely different ideological framework and producing different cultural outcomes. The path was not preserved by Russian virtue. It was not preserved by some superior cultural defence of traditional norms. It was prevented from propagating by ideological and political firewalls that had nothing to do with the cultural content those firewalls happened to block. Once the firewalls came down

after 1992, Russia became subject to substantial Western cultural-political propagation. Its path became more recognisably convergent with Western patterns. Then in the post-2010 period the Russian state began deliberately re-erecting selective firewalls.

Contemporary China is the cleaner contemporary case. The Great Firewall, combined with the Communist Party of China's deliberate curation of acceptable domestic ideological content, has produced an environment in which Western progressive cultural-political frames cannot reach the Chinese population at scale through any channel comparable to those operating in the Western space. The result is that contemporary China has not developed substantial domestic adoption of Western progressive cultural-political patterns at population scale. The Chinese institutional system has its own ideological convergence — a state-nationalist, Party-curated convergence with its own substantial costs and its own characteristic distortions. The convergence is not the Western one. It does not propagate from Western channels. The Chinese path is not preserved by Chinese cultural superiority. It is the consequence of deliberately blocked propagation channels.

Both cases require honest qualification. Neither pre-1992 Russia nor contemporary China is a healthy alternative to the Western convergence. Both produced and produce their own forms of authoritarian state-led convergence with their own substantial human costs. The analytical point is not that the propagation blocks were good or that the alternatives are preferable. The analytical point is narrower and stronger. The Western convergence depends on propagation. It is not historically inevitable. Where the propagation channels were blocked, the predicted convergence did not occur. The Western path is not the natural endpoint of modernity. It is the specific output of a propagation mechanism operating under specific institutional conditions. Where the mechanism cannot operate, the path does not unfold.

Latin America: convergence in a different direction

The Latin American case operates the same structural mechanism in a different ideological direction. It is therefore the cleanest available demonstration that the mechanism is general, not specifically Anglosphere. Across the post-1990 period, Latin American political life has exhibited its own convergent path — the pink tide of 2000s-2010s Bolivarian and post-Bolivarian socialism, the more recent neo-Bolivarian movements, and across the entire period a sustained drift of Latin American institutional life toward socialist ideological frames. The convergence is observable across Argentina (until recently), Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Different countries. Different specific national circumstances. The same convergent political-cultural path.

The mechanism is the same. Institutional capture: Latin American universities, judiciaries, NGO ecosystems, and senior administrative groups have been progressively populated by people whose ideological orientation favours socialist-redistributionist frames. The sorting is not centrally directed. The cumulative pattern of selection decisions produces population-level convergence. Cultural propagation: the captured institutions operate as transmission infrastructure for policy patterns and ideological frames through professional channels. Latin American academic

networks. The Catholic Church's liberation-theology infrastructure. Cuban cultural-political diplomacy. Spanish-language media. The explicit cross-border political organisations that have operated across the period (Foro de São Paulo from 1990, Grupo de Puebla from 2019). The propagation is fast, comprehensive, and ideologically uniform across the Spanish-speaking sphere.

What differs is the specific direction of the convergence. The difference is determined by which institutional system dominates the cultural and language sphere. The Anglosphere system rewards adoption of administrative-state-expansion policies framed in equity-diversity-inclusion language. The Latin American system rewards adoption of state-redistribution policies framed in socialist-Bolivarian language. Both systems operate the same mechanism — selection that produces an ideologically homogeneous political class, propagation through dense professional channels, one-directional bias determined by institutional incentives. Both produce convergent political-cultural paths within their respective spheres. The mechanism is general. The direction is locally determined.

The mechanism generalises. Where propagation is blocked, the convergence does not occur. Where propagation operates within a different institutional system, the convergence runs in a different ideological direction. The Anglosphere convergence toward managed-decline progressivism is one output of a general mechanism. It is not a unique civilisational phenomenon. The corrective — addressing institutional capture and the propagation channels that operate on it — is generally specifiable, even where the specific local content of the convergence differs.

6. The Asymmetric Propagation Question

The mechanism described so far explains how convergence occurs. It does not yet explain why the convergence in the Anglosphere has been so strikingly one-directional. Progressive policy innovations propagate rapidly across Anglosphere countries. Conservative policy innovations do not. The asymmetry needs its own explanation. A mechanism that produced symmetrical propagation would have produced symmetrical political outcomes. That is not what has occurred.

The asymmetry is documented across multiple domains. Progressive innovations — hate-speech legislation, equity bureaucracies, expansive immigration regimes, central-bank mission expansion, gender-identity legislation — have propagated across Anglosphere countries within years of first adoption. Conservative innovations — administrative-state restructuring, immigration enforcement, deregulatory frameworks, civil-service reform, judicial originalism, school-choice and education reform — have not propagated on comparable timescales. They have been attempted in multiple Anglosphere countries. They have produced measurable outcomes

where attempted. They have not propagated. The mechanism that explains the convergence has to also explain the asymmetry.

The structural answer is set out in detail in the prior brief on conservatism's structural failure⁴. The core is direct. The propagation infrastructure described in Section 3 is populated by people whose institutional incentives reward expanding administrative-state discretion and punish contracting it. A policy innovation that expands administrative discretion is a professional opportunity for the people in the propagation channels. It creates new positions. New mandates. New advocacy work. New consulting engagements. New academic research programmes. New regulatory guidance documents to draft. A policy innovation that contracts administrative discretion is a professional threat. It eliminates positions. It contracts mandates. It reduces advocacy work. It terminates consulting engagements. It makes existing professional expertise obsolete.

The propagation channels therefore do not propagate symmetrically. They propagate eagerly in the direction that rewards the people running them. They resist propagation in the direction that threatens them. The asymmetry is not the consequence of conspiracy. It is the consequence of professional self-interest operating across the people who populate the propagation infrastructure. Conservative innovations face structural headwinds in the channels regardless of their merit. Progressive innovations face structural tailwinds regardless of their merit. The asymmetric outcome is the predictable consequence of the directional bias built into the channels themselves.

This is why conservative parties that compete for office under the existing institutional rules typically fail to alter the path durably, even when they win elections. The election delivers the office. It does not alter the propagation infrastructure. The propagation channels continue operating asymmetrically through the entire conservative term. They keep propagating progressive innovations into the country at the same rate as before. They keep resisting the propagation of any conservative innovations the elected government attempts. The result is the well-documented Anglosphere pattern. Conservative governments preside over the continued advance of the progressive path, often at marginally slower rates, occasionally with rhetorical resistance, almost never with structural reversal. The path continues because the propagation infrastructure does not respond to the electoral outcome.

7. Implications for the Populist Response

Before the response strategies, one observation worth naming. The propagation mechanism produces a predictable downstream effect on the political system itself. As mainstream parties drift toward the political-class consensus the channels reward, they leave behind voter populations whose views have not shifted. Polling on most contested questions — immigration, integration, security, family, identity — shows remarkable stability in mass opinion across the post-1990 period. What has shifted is not voter opinion. It is the willingness of mainstream parties to represent it. The result is representational displacement.

Stable views held by substantial population segments find no political vehicle inside the major parties. New vehicles emerge outside them. One Nation in Australia. Reform UK. AfD. Le Pen. The Italian right. The Trump coalition itself. The progressive-aligned framing treats these movements as evidence of a mass shift toward extremism. The empirical record on opinion stability says otherwise. The movements are the structural correction of the gap the propagation mechanism has opened between mainstream parties and stable mass views.

The framing of these movements as extremist is doing specific work. It characterises views held by at least a third of the population as outside the bounds of legitimate political consideration. That framing only works if the captured infrastructure has shifted the perceived centre of legitimate opinion far enough leftward that stable mass views appear extreme. Whether it has done so successfully is itself a piece of evidence about the saturation operating across the propagation channels.

Once the mechanism is named, the implications for political response become specifiable. Movements that want to alter the convergent path must either restructure the propagation infrastructure itself or operate outside the conventional political channels until they have built enough independent leverage to force structural change. Movements that compete only for office under the existing institutional rules will not alter the path durably. The institutional rules are themselves the propagation infrastructure.

Three response strategies are observable in the contemporary Anglosphere and nearby democracies. The first is restructuring the institutional architecture itself. The second Trump administration's approach to administrative-state restructuring is the contemporary case in this category. The Schedule F reclassification. The Department of Government Efficiency. The systematic civil-service reductions. The regulatory rollback architecture. The repositioning of the federal workforce against the propagation channels. The approach is structurally responsive to the diagnosis. It does not aim to win the channels' approval. It aims to alter the channels' incentive structures and personnel composition. Whether it succeeds will depend on whether the restructuring is durable against subsequent administrations. That durability depends on how deeply the restructuring is institutionally embedded, versus how much it depends on continued political control.

The second strategy is operating outside the conventional political channels until independent leverage is generated. Meloni's pre-government period is a partial case. She built Fratelli d'Italia outside the Italian centre-right's existing accommodations until the party had a large enough independent base to force structural concessions in government. Milei's pre-presidential period is a more direct case. He built La Libertad Avanza outside the Argentine political establishment's existing channels and arrived in office with an explicit mandate to dismantle the structures the establishment had built. Both approaches accept that the existing propagation channels cannot

be persuaded. Both proceed by building parallel infrastructure that can either replace or coerce them.

The third strategy is the small-target approach pursued by most Anglosphere conservative parties across the post-1990 period. Compete for office under existing institutional rules. Accept the propagation channels as constraints. Attempt marginal policy adjustments within the path the channels permit. This strategy is documented in detail elsewhere in the canon⁵. On the structural diagnosis, it is structurally guaranteed to fail. The propagation channels do not respond to the electoral outcome. The path continues regardless of which party holds office, with rate adjustments at the margin and substantive direction undisturbed. The small-target strategy is not a weak version of the other two. It is a different strategy that produces a different outcome — continuation of the path at slightly reduced velocity. The conservative parties that have run it for thirty years have produced exactly the outcome the strategy structurally produces.

The choice depends on context and depth of institutional capture in the specific country. The available political and electoral terrain. The leverage that can be built outside the conventional channels. The willingness of the relevant publics to support structural restructuring against political-class resistance. The brief does take the position that the choice is consequential. Confusing the strategies — attempting structural restructuring with a small-target temperament, or attempting to build independent leverage from inside the existing institutional accommodations — produces the strategic failures that have repeatedly occurred across the period. Once the mechanism is named, the strategic choice can at least be made consciously.

Conclusion

The synchronised behaviour of Anglosphere political classes is not the product of conspiracy. It is the product of a structural mechanism with four observable components. Institutional capture by demographic and ideological groups whose incentive structures favour managed decline. Cultural propagation through professional channels populated by those groups. Globalisation and digital integration as accelerants. One-directional bias driven by the institutional incentives operating on the people who populate the channels.

The diagnosis is testable against comparative cases. Where the propagation channels were blocked, the predicted convergence did not occur. Pre-1992 Russia and contemporary China both demonstrate this. Where the channels operated within a different institutional system, the convergence ran in a different ideological direction. Latin America's convergence toward socialism through partly different institutional infrastructure demonstrates this. The mechanism is general. The Anglosphere convergence toward managed-decline progressivism is one output of the general mechanism. It is not a unique civilisational phenomenon. The Western path is not the natural endpoint of modernity. It is the specific output of a propagation mechanism operating under specific institutional conditions.

The corrective follows from the diagnosis. Movements that succeed in altering the path must address the propagation infrastructure itself. They can do this by restructuring the institutional

architecture in which the channels operate. Or they can build independent leverage outside the channels. Movements that compete only for office under the existing institutional rules will not alter the path durably. The path is generated by the institutional rules, not by the electoral cycle. The diagnosis does not determine the choice between the structural-restructuring and independent-leverage strategies. Both are consistent with it. What the diagnosis rules out is the third strategy — the small-target approach. The prior canon has documented it as the dominant approach of Anglosphere conservative parties across the post-1990 period. The structural diagnosis shows it is guaranteed to fail.

Once the mechanism is named, the political conversation can be returned to the structural ground where it can be argued honestly. The convergence has been the unspoken backdrop of Anglosphere politics for three decades. Naming it is the first step in addressing it.

Notes

¹ On the diagnostic detail of the synchronised political-class hostility to the current American executive cohort, see Prothean Institute, *The Idiot Reading: Why the Anglosphere Right Still Thinks There's an Idiot in the White House*, Policy Brief, May 2026, particularly Section 3. On the bilateral and decorum-related dimensions of the same synchronised behaviour, see Prothean Institute, *Decorum Discarded: How the Anglosphere Political Class Broke a Working Bilateral Norm and Sent the Bill to Its Own Publics*, Policy Brief, May 2026.

² On the demographic incentive structure of the contemporary Anglosphere political class and its consequences for policy preferences, see Prothean Institute, *The Generational Stake: Why Different Fertility Patterns Produce Different Incentive Structures — and What That Predicts About Political Behaviour*, Policy Brief, May 2026.

³ On the structural conservatism of the contemporary Anglosphere right and its failure to alter the convergent trajectory, see Prothean Institute, *Nothing Left to Conserve: The Structural Conservatism That Keeps Losing the Culture War and the Reckoning That's Overdue*, Policy Brief, April 2026.

⁴ Prothean Institute, *Nothing Left to Conserve*, op. cit., particularly Sections 3 and 4 on the institutional architecture of the regulatory-administrative state and the asymmetric incentive structures operating on its administrators.

⁵ On the small-target strategy as structural electoral failure mode, see Prothean Institute, *Winning Through Visibility: Why the Small Target Strategy Fails in a Hostile Media Environment*, Policy Brief, May 2025. On the philosophical and civilisational dimensions of the convergent trajectory the brief treats as the strategic terrain, see Prothean Institute, *Lost Coherence: Unified Social Energy, the Monument Problem, and the Structural Conditions of Civilisational Flourishing*, Whitepaper, March 2026, and *Thus Spake Ilos*, Whitepaper, v3, May 2026.

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